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In the European multi-centre study BeSeCu, interviews in seven countries were conducted in 
order to explore emotional, behavioural and cognitive responses during disasters as 
experienced by survivors. Interviews (either in groups or one-to-one) were run by type of 
event: terror attack, fire, collapse of a building, earthquake and flood. While the 
environmental cues and ability to recognise what was happening varied in different disasters, 
survivor responses tended to be more universal across events, and were most often adaptive 
and non-selfish. Several peritraumatic factors related to current levels of posttraumatic stress 
were identified, while memory quantity did not differ as a function of event type or 
posttraumatic stress. Time since event had a small effect on what was recalled. Based on the 
findings, suggestions for emergency training are made. 
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Introduction 
In the past decade (2000–09), 899 natural and technological disasters have occurred in 
Europe, claiming the lives of 89,317 people and affecting 9,196,702 people.
2
 Among the most 
common events in Europe are natural disasters,
3
 with more notable recent cases including the 
floods in the Czech Republic and Germany in 2002 and the floods in Poland in 2010, as well 
as the Marmara earthquake in Turkey in 1999 and the L’Aquila earthquake in Italy in 2009. In 
addition, Europe has seen some high profile man-made disasters, such as the bombings in 
Madrid, Spain, in 2004 and in London, United Kingdom, in 2005. Since these terror attacks 
and those in the United States on 11 September 2001, public awareness of man-made disasters 
has increased in Europe (Grimm, Schmidt and Hulse, 2009). Coupled with the incidence rates, 
this suggests a mounting need for disaster research/emergency psychology in Europe. This is 
especially true given that studies are revealing several misconceptions about the types of 
responses that emergencies evoke in people. For example, a number of widely-held beliefs 
among the public and the media have been shown to be incorrect, such as that looting, mass 
panic, and selfish behaviour are common in disasters, and should be abandoned in favour of 
realistic, proactive emergency knowledge (Alexander, 2007; Prati, Catufi, and Pietrantoni, 
2012). By understanding better what actions people actually take and their thought processes 
as an emergency unfolds, members of the public and emergency personnel will be better 
equipped to deal with a disaster, and the economic, physical, and psychological consequences 
of such events can be mitigated. Pinpointing and comprehending emotional responses relevant 
to counterproductive behaviour during disasters and the development of subsequent 
psychological distress will also aid the public and professionals, both during and after an 
incident.  
                                                 
2 See http://www.emdat.be. 
3
 See http://www.emdat.be. 
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One fruitful approach to identifying actual human behaviour, as well as emotional and 
cognitive processing, in disasters is to examine the retrospective narratives of survivors. 
Sotgiu and Galati (2007) asked survivors about their experience during the flood in Italy in 
2000 and found that participants remembered well the emergency phase and reported a variety 
of emotions, such as fear, sadness, and surprise. Prati, Catufi, and Pietrantoni (2012) noted 
similar emotional responses by survivors of earthquakes in Italy, and highlighted the main 
coping responses during the earthquake: flight; freeze; seek shelter; no reaction, because the 
individual did not realise what was happening; look for relatives and try to protect them; seek 
additional information from the social environment; and completion of previous activities. 
Pro-social behaviours were common and looting did not occur. These studies suggest that the 
most frequently experienced emotions and behaviours in disasters may be adaptive (for 
instance, to fear life-threatening stimuli and to look for ways to avoid or limit the negative 
consequences) and non-selfish. They suggest, too, that responses may depend on a person’s 
ability and/or need to recognise and make sense of cues to the life-threatening stimuli. The 
current study sought to complement this field of research by widening the focus to include 
survivors’ accounts from a variety of European natural and man-made disasters, assessing the 
behaviours, emotions, and cognitions described therein. 
When including survivors’ descriptions of events, one must consider functions of 
memory. There is reason to believe that many details of disasters will be recalled to good 
effect by the people who experienced them firsthand, even when a number of years have 
passed. Studies in forensic and cognitive psychology, gauging the accuracy and consistency 
of eyewitness reports of emotional events, have shown that arousal enhances remembering of 
situations (Christianson, 1992; van Giezen et al., 2005; Hulse et al., 2007). In the case of 
natural disasters, emotional involvement and exposure to an earthquake has been associated 
with improved recall of the event itself (Neisser, 1996), in comparison only to seeing the 
event on television (Er, 2000). Furthermore, disaster-related interviews about Hurricane Hugo 
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(1989) and Hurricane Andrew (1992) have revealed remarkable memory stability over time 
(Norris and Kaniasty, 1992; Bahrick et al., 1998; Fivush et al., 2004). However, while 
exposure to and greater involvement in emergency events that produce heightened emotional 
states may help to enhance memory, such experiences may also contribute to the development 
of post-traumatic stress symptoms in some individuals (Bernat et al., 1998). Post-traumatic 
stress, conversely, is linked to impaired memory functions. For example, post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) sufferers may find that certain aspects of the traumatic event come to mind 
easily and vividly while other details are difficult to recollect intentionally in sequence or at 
all (Halligan et al., 2003). In addition, there is evidence that the memories of persons who 
suffer PTSD about the traumatic events are disjointed from autobiographical memory and 
feature different characteristics, such as sensory components or the feeling that the memory is 
not in the past but is happening ‘here and now’ (Kleim, Wallott, and Ehlers, 2008). 
Consequently, it is important to take into account the presence of post-traumatic stress 
symptoms in survivors when examining how they recall their disaster experience. 
Apart from memory function, post-traumatic stress after a disaster experience is 
closely related to survivors’ peri-traumatic responses. Studies have shown that post-traumatic 
stress symptoms are best predicted by peri-traumatic factors, such as emotions and cognitions 
displayed by survivors during the event (Ozer et al., 2003), including negative feelings and 
perceived threats (Brunet et al., 2001), dissociation (Marmar et al., 1994), and physiological 
factors related to a panic attack (Fikretoglu et al., 2006). However, while the influence of peri-
traumatic emotional and cognitive processing on post-traumatic outcome is well-established, 
to our knowledge no studies have investigated the relationship between peri-traumatic 
behavioural responses and post-traumatic stress. The Cognitive Model of PTSD of Ehlers and 
Clark (2000) suggests that PTSD sufferers are likely to apply dysfunctional cognitive 
strategies after experiencing the traumatic event. Following this approach, one can assume 
that counterproductive behaviour during the traumatic situation will be more likely to lead to 
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the development and maintenance of PTSD symptoms, as PTSD sufferers generalise the 
behaviour displayed in the traumatic situation to their general behaviour in their everyday 
lives. We believe, therefore, that there is reason to investigate the relationship between peri-
traumatic behaviour and the development of post-traumatic distress. 
The following exploratory study aimed to collect accounts from survivors of a wide 
range of European natural and man-made disasters using a standardised interview procedure, 
as well as to identify which kinds of behavioural, emotional, and cognitive responses were 
displayed. An evaluation was performed to investigate whether these responses were related 
to (i) the type of disaster and (ii) levels of post-traumatic stress, while (iii) taking memory 
functions into account. 
As studies of a single natural hazard (that is, an earthquake or a flood) have reported 
similar, adaptive responses (Sotgiu and Galati, 2007; Prati, Catufi, and Pietrantoni, 2012), the 
current study examined if survivor responses displayed in different types of natural and man-
made disasters would be similar or if they would be specific to the incidents. Accounts were 
grouped according to the type of disaster experienced. It was expected that survivor 
responses, while featuring some differences across different disasters according to the 
incident-related cues of specific situations, would nevertheless be adaptive. 
The influence of current level of post-traumatic stress was assessed and accounts from 
participants with lower post-traumatic stress were compared to accounts from participants 
with higher post-traumatic stress. Retrospective assessments of the intensities of peri-
traumatic emotions and cognitions have revealed differences related to the level of trauma 
(Brunet et al., 2001; Basoglu, Salcioglu, and Livanou, 2002; Ozer et al., 2003; Basoglu et al., 
2004), hence we expected not just emotional and cognitive responses to differ but also peri-
traumatic behaviour, including the way of reacting (for example, instinctive, rational, 
resigned) or discrete actions such as actively rescuing oneself or others, to differ as a function 
of post-traumatic stress.  
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Finally, possible confounds had to be considered in the analysis: differences in the 
accounts between groups with high and low levels of post-traumatic stress might also arise 
from memory functions. Thus, the quantity of information recalled by both groups was 
compared. To consider further the effects influencing the reliability of the analysis, memory 
retrieval as a function of time passed since the event was investigated. Although 
autobiographical memory for emotionally arousing events is meant to be relatively stable 
owing to characteristics such as distinctiveness, sudden occurrence, or repeated reporting of 
the incident (because of public interest) (Pohl, 2007), we decided nevertheless to assess the 
time factor in our sample. Also of interest was whether the interview would generate similar 
levels of detail for all types of disasters and hence differences in memory quantity/reporting 
units were compared across events. It was believed that no differences in memory/reporting 
quantity would be a positive outcome vis-à-vis the reliability and validity of the analysis. 
 
Methods 
The study described in this paper is part of a larger cross-cultural multi-centre research 
project called BeSeCu (Behaviour, Security, Culture), with participating centres in: 
Barcelona, Spain; Greifswald and Hamburg, Germany; Izmir, Turkey; London, UK; Prague, 
Czech Republic; Stockholm, Sweden; and Warsaw, Poland. It was approved by all national 
institutional ethics committees. 
 
Events 
Of interest were emergency events with the following characteristics: (a) they occurred 
within approximately 10 years of the interview, concentrated in a particular time and space; 
(b) they concerned an identifiable hazard that posed a physical threat but of a non-infectious 
kind (that is, excluding emergencies such as epidemics); (c) a threat was posed to lives and/or 
property (with the lives and/or property being many, such as a large number of people in a 
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single structure or smaller groups of people located across a number of nearby structures); (d) 
the emergency services attended the scene; and (e) a full or partial evacuation of the affected 
structure(s) was attempted, either by the victims or by official agents. Numerous events in the 
countries of the participating centres met the above criteria, notably: the discotheque fire in 
Gothenburg, Sweden, in 1998 and a fire in a hospital in Hamburg, Germany, in 2007; the 
earthquake in Marmara, Turkey, in 1999; the floods in the Czech Republic in 2002; the 7 July 
bombings in London, UK, in 2005; and the collapse of the roof of the Katowice Trade Hall in 
Poland and of a multi-storey residential building in Spain in 2006. The bombings in Mumbai, 
India, in 2008 also were of interest as several German tourists were caught up in them.  
 
Participants 
Individual recruitment occurred in each centre, using word-of-mouth and advertising 
campaigns conducted via the emergency services, the media, and self-help groups. Adult 
survivors were invited to contact the researchers if they wished to take part in an interview. 
Participation was restricted to persons who had experienced directly the emergency event—
bystanders and relatives of victims were excluded. Also excluded were persons who had 
survived incidents that turned out not to match all of the aforementioned event characteristics. 
From a total of 134 persons who voluntarily participated in the study, 125 were included in 
the analysis, with approximately equal numbers of females (52.8 per cent) and males (47.2 per 
cent). Nine per cent of participants had a migrant background, but no significant differences 
were found between migrants and natives with regard to age, education, gender, and type of 
event. Thus, migrant status is not discussed further in this paper. The socio-demographic, 
incident-related characteristics, and Impact of Event Scale-Revised (IES-R) total mean (M) 




Interview. A semi-structured interview was designed by an intercultural and interdisciplinary 
team of experts, including emergency physicians, fire-fighters and fire-safety engineers, 
psychotherapists specialised in trauma, and scientists. The interview involved techniques from 
a cognitive interview (Fisher and Geiselman, 1992), such as asking participants mentally to 
reinstate the context and to start with an uninterrupted free narrative. Cognitive interview 
techniques have been shown to enhance the recall of event details (Köhnken et al., 1999). The 
narrative was followed by probing questions that focused on four main themes: Eight 
questions were asked about the ‘initial context’ (such as the setting and recognition/realisation 
that an emergency was occurring); thirteen questions were asked about the ‘emergency phase’ 
(when survivors and others began to respond to the emergency—details about evacuation, 
emergency services’ interventions, and reactions); three questions were asked about emotional 
processing; and four questions were asked about cognitive appraisal (such as risk perception, 
self-efficacy) during the disaster. 
 
Questionnaires. Two questionnaires were administered. The first asked participants for socio-
demographic information (such as age and gender) and incident details (such as date and 
duration). The second was a validated national version of the IES-R (Weiss and Marmar, 
1997; Maercker and Schützwohl, 1998; Baguena et al., 2001; Preiss et al., 2004; Corapcioglu 
et al., 2006; Juczyński and Ogińska-Bulik, 2009; Sveen et al., 2010). The IES-R is a 
commonly used self-report measure that assesses post-traumatic stress symptomatology in the 
past seven days and possesses satisfactory psychometric properties (Joseph, 2000; Sundin and 
Horowitz, 2003). Although the IES-R usually is applied to more recent events than those 
studied here, it was administered because to the best of our knowledge there is no comparable, 
cross-culturally validated instrument that can be applied to any specific life-event (such as 




Participants were first asked to complete the two questionnaires pertaining to the 
disaster that they would go on to describe. Then they were interviewed. Interviews were 
conducted either in groups (such as dyads or triads, mini-groups, or in groupings by kind of 
event) or on a one-to-one basis. One-to-one interviews generally were chosen when the event 
was particularly traumatic or sensitive. Overall, 29 group interviews and 12 one-to-one 
interviews were held across the centres. All of the interviews were led by experienced 
psychologists and recorded on audiotape or videotape with the participants’ consent. The 
average duration of an interview was 90 minutes. Interviewers were vigilant to signs of upset 
and participants were informed from the outset that they could take a break or withdraw from 
the study altogether if they so wished. 
 
Data analysis 
Content analysis. Interviews were transcribed verbatim according to transcribing guidelines. 
At an international workshop, a theoretical framework based on statements from each country 
and each event was designed in order to conduct a content analysis. Statements were assessed 
per interview. Content analyses were performed in each country separately with two 
independent coders. The quantity of categories was assessed across all interviews at the final 
data-checking stage by the coordinating centre. Statements given by participants were 
classified into course of event (initial context and emergency phase) and emotional and 
cognitive processing of the event. Analysis revealed the following dimensions: 
recognition/realisation, interpretation, reaction, evacuation decision, evacuation process, 
emotion, self-efficacy, risk perception, worst moment, and improvement (see Table 2). As the 
information given was very rich, dimensions had to be divided into domains and then into 
categories. Considering the scope of this paper, only an overview of the most common 
dimensions, domains, and categories for the initial context and emergency phase of the 
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disaster and the emotional and cognitive processing of the event are presented in the results 
section below.  
 
Inter-coder reliability. For the assessment of inter-coder reliability, an international team of 
three centres was established (Lauf, 2001). The coding process was evaluated in one step 
from identifying relevant talk in the full transcript until final choice of categories according to 
the theoretical framework. Reliability of data was calculated with Krippendorff’s alpha 
(Krippendorff, 2004). The advantages of using Krippendorff’s alpha are the ability to deal 
with small sample sizes and multiple coders as well as its accommodation of and 
comparability to all common scales of measurement. One should note that inter-coder 
reliability was higher when conducting it in national centres, 0.91, yet still sufficient in bi-
national ratings, 0.79 and 0.80. Inter-coder reliability for dimensions varied across transcripts 
(see Table 3). The dimensions interpretation, evacuation process, and worst moment were 
especially high. Other dimensions varied across transcripts with sufficient ratings. Only in the 
dimension evacuation decision was inter-coder reliability not sufficiently high, so the validity 
of data for this dimension cannot be assumed. 
 
Statistical analysis. The content analysis produced dichotomous nominal data. To assess the 
influence of post-traumatic stress and type of event on survivor accounts, Chi-squared tests 
were conducted. In addition, the effect sizes Cramer’s V and Cramer’s Phi were calculated for 
type of event and post-traumatic stress, respectively. There were no missing cases for the 
condition type of event. Missing cases on the IES-R (four single items) were imputed using a 
regression model (conditional mean imputation) (Schafer and Graham, 2002). The IES-R was 
used to group participants with high and low post-traumatic stress by a cut-off of the total 
IES-R score of 33, as suggested by Creamer, Bell, and Faila (2003). Group interviews were 
ranked in the high-stress condition if the mean scores of all participants were above the cut-
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off score, and vice versa for the low-stress group. Since not all of the focus groups could be 
grouped clearly, analyses involving post-traumatic stress include 15 of the 29 group 
interviews and all of the one-to-one interviews. The influence of post-traumatic stress, time 
elapsed since the event, and type of event on memory retrieval/reporting units was evaluated 
with T-tests, correlations, and analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests, respectively. The partial 
eta squared and Cohen’s d of the effect sizes were calculated for type of event and post-




Behavioural, emotional, and cognitive responses 
Participants’ responses are illustrated in Tables 4 and 5. As can be seen, the most 
commonly reported behavioural response to a disaster was a supportive one. Many 
participants reported people helping each other through the incident. Actions taken to save 
other people’s lives were also common. After these altruistic acts, the next most commonly 
reported behaviours were preparing for evacuation and seeking information.  
  
With regard to how participants felt during the disaster, fear and panic were the two 
most commonly reported emotions, with nervousness coming third. Next, participants 
reported experiencing physiological reactions, such as palpitations, and feelings of 
derealisation or dissociation. Their thoughts appeared to centre largely on the threat posed, 
with the most commonly reported cognition being the perception of high risk. However, 
participants also reported what went through their mind when they were initially presented 
with cues to the emergency, whether these were from the environment or from other people. 
Cognitions in this phase focused most frequently on their understanding of what was 
happening and whether they estimated the seriousness of the situation appropriately.  
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Also of interest was the way of reacting. Three methods were reported. First, 
participants reporting instinctive reactions described automatic responses. They said that they 
just reacted during the event; they did not think about what to do next, nor did they reflect on 
emotional or cognitive states or plan their behaviour. Second, participants reporting a rational 
way of reacting stayed calm, and anticipated possible actions in the given situation and their 
consequences. Moreover, they were proactive for the most part in trying to manage an 
evacuation/rescue. In all, there was little difference between whether participants reported 
reacting in an instinctive or in a rational way. Third, participants reporting resignation were 
convinced that they were at the mercy of the situation and were not able to influence the 
outcome; hence they did not react. Only a small percentage of survivors reported resignation. 
 
Type of event and responses 
As one might expect, how participants came to recognise the situation they faced 
differed across disasters. Smoke/flames/fire were reported in fires and terror attacks (Chi
2
 
(4,41)=23,01, p<0.001; V=0.37) and an explosion in terror attacks and the collapse of a 
building (Chi
2
 (4,41)=15,72, p<0.01; V=0.31). Water was only mentioned as a cue in the 
flood condition (Chi
2
 (4,41)=33,21, p<0.001; V=0.45). The realisation of something unusual 
happening due to people shouting and noise was not related to any specific disaster (Chi
2
 
(4,41)=6,82, p=0.15; V=0.20). Neither were participants more significantly informed by 
others in any specific incident (Chi
2
 (4,41)=9,36, p=0.06; V=0.24). Participants reported 
significantly more often their ability to recognise/realise their situation being impaired, 
mainly through being asleep, during the initial phase of the collapse of buildings (Chi
2
 
(4,41)=12,01, p<0.05; V=0.27). The correct interpretation of the disaster usually was made in 
fires and earthquakes (Chi
2
 (4,41)=14,49, p<0.01; V=0.30). Underestimation of seriousness 
was primarily reported in floods (Chi
2
 (4,41)=14,29, p<0.01; V=0.29).  
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In relation to reactions, neither instinctive nor rational reactions were related to 
specific incidents with Chi
2
 (4,41)=4,32 p=0.36; V=0.16 and Chi
2
 (4,41)=7,12, p=0.13; 
V=0.21, respectively. In addition, resignation was not related to any specific incident (Chi
2
 
(4,41)=3,81 p=0.43; V=0.15). Supportive behaviour was reported in all cases except for fires 
(Chi
2
 (4,41)=16,28, p<0.01; V=0.31). Saving family and friends was reported more often in 
domestic or professional settings, such as in a collapse of a building, an earthquake, a fire, and 
a flood than in public places such as during terror attacks (Chi
2
 (4,41)=10,06, p<0.05; 
V=0.25). Preparation for evacuation was not related to any event (Chi
2
 (4,41)=7,04, p=0.13; 
V=0.21), and seeking information was independent of the disaster participants were 
experiencing (Chi
2
 (4,41)=3,50, p=0.48; V=0.15). 
With regard to emotional and cognitive processing, fear, nervousness, panic, 
dissociation/ derealisation and physiological reactions were not related to specific incidents 
with Chi
2
 (4,41)=3,24, p=0.52; V=0.14, Chi
2





 (4,41)=8,51, p=0.07; V=0.23, and Chi
2
 (4,41)=8,45, p=0.08; V=0.23, 
respectively. Although a high level of perceived risk was not related to any incident (Chi
2
 
(4,41)=4,87, p=0.30; V=0.17), a low level of perceived risk was reported significantly more in 
fires (Chi
2
 (4,41)=10,93, p<0.05; V=0.26).  
The effect sizes of significant results ranged from V=0.25 to V=0.45 and for 
insignificant results from V=0.14 to V=0.24. 
 
Post-traumatic stress and responses 
Experiencing an explosion and being impaired at the initial stage of the disaster was 
reported significantly more often by the high post-traumatic stress group than by the low post-
traumatic stress group (see Table 4). The only behavioural responses that differed according 
to current levels of post-traumatic stress were preparing for evacuation and seeking 
information: participants in the low post-traumatic stress group reported these behaviours 
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significantly more often than those in the high post-traumatic stress group. Regarding 
emotional and cognitive responses, the high post-traumatic stress group reported significantly 
more experience of derealisation/dissociation and physiological reactions than did the low 
post-traumatic stress group. The low post-traumatic stress group in turn reported significantly 
more often low perceived risk (see Table 5). No other significant differences were found as a 
function of post-traumatic stress. Effect sizes of significant results ranged from Phi=0.37 to 
Phi=0.47; effect sizes for insignificant results ranged from Phi=0.02 to Phi=0.37. 
 
Effects on memory quantity 
On average, 31.51 (SD=6.64) statements were given per interview. Considering 
different stages of the disaster per interview, about the initial context of the event a mean of 
5.76 (SD = 1.73) statements were given. About the emergency phase of the disaster, more 
than twice as many statements were given (M=13.49, SD= 3.23). A mean of 2.73 (SD=1.25) 
statements were given about emotions and 5.76 (SD = 2.59) about cognitions (self-efficacy 
and risk perception).  
One-way ANOVAs indicated no significant main effect of the type of disaster for the 
memory quantity measured in the amount of overall statements (F (4,40)=1.08, p=0.38; 
η2=0.15), but also not for the different stages of the event, such as the initial context (F 
(4,40)=0.74, p=0.57; η2=0.09), emergency phase (F (4,40)=1.55, p=0.21; η2=0.21), emotional 
(F (4,40)=0.47, p=0.76; η2=0.07), or cognitive processing (F (4,40)=2.09, p=0.10; η2=0.16). 
Nor did post-traumatic stress have any significant effect on the amount of statements reported 
overall (T=-0.49, p=0.63; d=0.19) and on the initial context (T=1.69, p=0.10; d=0.72), 
emergency phase (T=-1.08, p=0.29; d=0.26), emotional (T=1.58, p=0.13; d=0.59), or 
cognitive processing (T=-0.49, p=0.62; d=0.10). Finally, no significant relationship was 
found between the time since the event and the amount reported in the interviews overall 
(r=0.03, p=0.86) and with respect to the about emergency phase (r=0.03, p=0.87), emotional 
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(r=0.06, p=0.71), or cognitive processing (r=0.21, p=0.19). A significant negative correlation 
was found only for the time passed since the incident and the statements given by participants 
about the initial context (r=-0.22, p<0.05). 
 
Discussion 
This is the first explorative study to investigate behavioural, emotional, and cognitive 
responses during disasters using interviews with a wide sample of European disaster 
survivors. It was possible to assess the impacts of natural catastrophes (earthquakes and 
floods), man-made terror attacks, as well as fires and the collapse of buildings in one study 
with the same set of instruments. It was also possible to obtain detailed recollections despite 
the disasters occurring several years ago.  
The main findings of this study confirm somewhat the indications from previous 
interviews with disaster survivors (Sotgiu and Galati, 2007; Prati, Catufi, and Pietrantoni, 
2012): that the responses displayed by survivors during the event most often are adaptive, to 
an extent, and non-selfish. The most frequently reported emotions and cognitions were fear 
and the perception of high risk, while the most frequently reported behaviours were extending 
support to others and attempting to save lives. This shows that survivors had recognised the 
danger present, yet acted in ways that did not benefit their own survival. Of course, aiding 
others could be described as maladaptive behaviour—the consequences could be a delay to 
one’s own evacuation and an increase in personal risk. However, one should bear in mind 
that, in some of the disasters sampled, such as the bombings in London in 2005, evacuation 
was not always a viable immediate option. Some survivors were trapped for an hour or more. 
Hence, the altruistic behaviour displayed did not necessarily jeopardise the survivors’ 
personal well-being. Moreover, taking steps during the event to be with people and to aid their 
well-being conceivably could help reduce survivors’ trauma both at the time (cf. social 
attachment model; Mawson, 2005) and in the long term (for example, minimise survivor 
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guilt). Therefore, a more detailed analysis of altruistic responses in disasters is relevant: are 
there specific circumstances when altruistic behaviour is displayed? Will altruistic behaviour 
stop at saving the core family or extend to saving strangers if they are also present? How do 
altruistic persons rate their own peri-traumatic risk? As there is obviously a need in humans 
not only to save their own lives but also to help others, the results of further investigations 
could be integrated into emergency training so that counterproductive attempts to rescue 
others are avoided and disaster victims apply the right strategies. 
This study also supported the idea that survivors’ responses may depend on one’s 
ability/need to recognise and to make sense of cues to life-threatening stimuli. The detailed 
analysis of the content revealed that, despite the different disasters being highlighted by clear 
characteristics such as explosions, fire, flames, smoke, and water, in less than one-half of all 
interviews did participants report making the right interpretation of the cues. Furthermore, in 
about one-third of all interviews, participants were underestimating the seriousness of the 
event—compare this with the study of Prati, Catufi and Pietrantoni (2012) of the Umbria–
Marche earthquake of 1997, when 10 per cent of survivors did not recognise or understand 
what was happening. The correct interpretation was more often made in the current study in 
relation to earthquakes and fires, which might be because of emergency trials and thus public 
knowledge about these situations or past experience of these disasters (Alexander, 1990). 
Underestimation of seriousness was reported by participants who had experienced a flood. 
The reason for this might be the long onset of the disaster, which in turn could lead to a delay 
in self-evacuation and increase the need for the emergency services to direct resources to 
rescue operations.  
Based on these results, public security training should be tailored to specific disasters, 
instructing people in the unique characteristics of different events, thereby helping them to 
recognise the cues and the dangers attached to them more quickly, and boosting their 
understanding of how to react appropriately. The results also imply that further research needs 
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to be conducted with representative samples in a quantitative research setting, gathering 
survivor accounts of different types of disasters in order to generalise event-related cues 
across different events.  
The reports of impairments (such as consumption of alcohol and sleeping through the 
initial cues) in this study, although few in comparison, suggest that there is also still room for 
improvement in warning systems and devices to facilitate swifter awareness of what is 
happening. A very challenging task in this field will be to improve rescue aids or evacuation 
strategies for people impaired owing to alcohol or drugs. The importance of a further 
investigation of states of impairment is underlined by the finding that this situation was 
identified more often in the group with higher levels of post-traumatic stress (cf. Ehlers and 
Clark, 2000). For medical and psychological support after disasters, it should be clarified if 
alcohol/drug consumption during the event could be classified as vulnerability criteria for the 
development of later psychological distress.  
Leach (2004) divided human responses to disasters roughly into three groups, 
appearing in 10–15, 75, and 10–15 per cent of the population respectively: calm; reflexive, 
almost automatic; and counterproductive behaviour, adding to the victim’s danger. In the 
current study there were almost an equal number of reports of instinctive and rational 
reactions, with no significant impact vis-à-vis type of disaster or level of post-traumatic stress. 
Similarly, reports of reacting with resignation did not occur according to type of disaster or 
level of post-traumatic stress. It is perhaps too early to conclude whether people react 
automatically/instinctively as opposed to with more controlled, conscious processing, or 
whether they are likely to just give up, depending more on the characteristics of the 
individual, independent of the situation, and later on emotional and cognitive states.  
Future research with a larger sample to investigate ways of reacting in disasters would 
likely enhance understanding of the influence of peri-traumatic states on post-traumatic 
outcome. According to the Cognitive Model of PTSD (Ehlers and Clark, 2000), in particular, 
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PTSD sufferers tend to generalise from having no control during the disaster to having no 
control over their lives. Moreover, the influence of past experience of disasters and security 
training should be considered. Training in survival procedures is recommended in order to 
allow people to create memory schemas of actions in disasters and thus ease the appropriate 
response during disasters (see Leach, 2004). Furthermore, a classification of human responses 
during disasters might help emergency services to interact with survivors in relevant 
situations. 
Despite some reports of resignation, among the most frequently reported behaviours 
were to prepare for evacuation and to seek information on the rescue, suggesting that many 
participants were optimistic of escaping the situation. Preparation for evacuation might 
indicate a delay in flight, especially in domestic settings if people cannot override the usual 
actions they might take before leaving their home (getting dressed and collecting one’s keys 
and wallet, for instance) and therefore pose a threat to survival. However, survivors also 
reported interactions with rescue services and being told to prepare to leave their home while 
waiting for fire-fighters, in order to be guided out of the building using masks. In comparable 
situations immediate flight without professional assistance could have lethal consequences. It 
is interesting that both responses were reported more by participants with lower current post-
traumatic stress. One might assume that actively planning for/assisting in the rescue gave 
survivors a feeling of control over the situation, which might have a positive effect on the 
development of post-traumatic stress symptoms. Indeed, there is research that has established 
a link between peri-traumatic helplessness and post-traumatic stress (Joseph et al., 1994) and 
so it should follow that a sense of not feeling helpless during the event would reduce the 
likelihood of developing post-traumatic stress. 
While fear was a dominant emotion in the current study, reported across all types of 
disaster, ‘panic’ was reported just as frequently; much more than in other similar research (for 
instance, only eight per cent of participants reported panic in the Prati, Catufi and Pietrantoni 
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(2012)  study of the Umbria–Marche earthquake). A clarification must be made, though: the 
participants in this study tended to use ‘panic’ in a colloquial way, meaning a negative form 
of excitement and an amplification of ‘fear’, rather than mass panic (see Dombrowsky and 
Pajonk, 2005), or psychological definitions of panic attacks in themselves or in others. From 
an analysis of the transcripts, the occurrence of a mass panic with fatalities can only be 
assumed on one occasion. 
As well as reporting feelings, participants often referred to physiological reactions 
associated with heightened emotional states and the sense of dissociation. These phenomena 
were reported significantly more often by participants in the high post-traumatic stress group 
rather than in the low one. This would appear to complement results from a meta-analysis 
conducted by Ozer et al. (2003), which revealed that peri-traumatic variables were better 
predictors of PTSD than pre- or post-traumatic variables, and that peri-traumatic dissociation 
was the strongest predictor. Furthermore, Fikretoglu et al. (2006) found physiological 
symptoms of a panic attack during the traumatic event to be a good predictor of later post-
traumatic distress. A relationship with post-traumatic stress would also be expected based on 
other research on this topic, concerning perceived life threat and fear (Basoglu, Salcioglu, and 
Livanou, 2002; Simeon et al., 2003; Basoglu et al., 2004). However, there is reason for 
caution: owing to the fact that only the occurrence and not the intensity of peri-traumatic 
states was collected, definitive relationships between fear/risk perception and post-traumatic 
stress cannot be derived from the above research. Findings involving retrospective ratings of 
the intensity of peri-traumatic emotional stress and risk perception and their influence on 
current PTSD symptoms in this sample are given elsewhere (see Grimm, Hulse, Preiss, and 
Schmidt, under revision); in brief, those findings demonstrated that the relationship between 
peri-traumatic and post-traumatic states is not necessarily straightforward. 
Factors such as one’s ability to detect cues being initially impaired and exposure to 
certain types of cue were reported more often in groups with higher post-traumatic stress 
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symptomatology, but so too were the behavioural responses that occurred prior to evacuation. 
This study, then, established an initial link between peri-traumatic behaviour and post-
traumatic stress. However, owing to the characteristics of the sample, such as its size, it is 
believed that further investigations of this topic with larger, representative samples will prove 
useful to understand better peri-traumatic behaviour, its interaction with peri-traumatic 
emotional and cognitive states across different types of disasters, and post-traumatic stress 
symptoms. Further investigation of the different components of both the situation and the 
individual responses to it will be beneficial for understanding of the development of post-
traumatic stress following disasters. As disaster victims do not only suffer material losses or 
physical injuries, but also psychological distress after disasters (acute stress disorder, anxiety 
symptoms, depression, or PTSD), which cause a lot of damage to victims, families, and 
society, broad knowledge of disaster responses and vulnerability factors will lead to more 
effective post-disaster medical and psychological interventions. 
A significant link between post-traumatic stress and the amount of information 
recalled was not found in this sample, either for the different phases of the disaster or for the 
overall reports. It would be premature to conclude from this that post-traumatic stress has no 
effect on memory of disaster experiences, as current experimental studies suggest that the 
traumatic memories of PTSD sufferers are disjointed from their autobiographical memories 
(Kleim, Wallott, and Ehlers, 2008). One must consider that the societal interest in disasters 
(such as sharing experiences with other victims, family members, friends, local authorities 
and/or the media) might enhance the consistency of reports. Indeed, disaster survivors have 
been found to show higher consistency of retrospective reports of peri-traumatic states in 
comparison to victims of physical abuse/assault (Ouimette, Read, and Brown, 2005). Owing 
to our recruitment strategy, it is possible that a self-selection bias might have hindered persons 
with disorganised or incomplete memories due to traumatic stress from taking part in the 
study. However, there was a significant difference in the amount recalled for the different 
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phases independent of level of post-traumatic stress. The initial context was less well 
remembered than the emergency phase, with more than twice as many statements being 
reported about the latter. This could simply be because of the fact that more probing questions 
were asked about the emergency phase in the interview than about the initial context. 
Nonetheless, this finding is consistent with that of Sotgiu and Galati (2007) and Bahrick et al. 
(1998) in their assessments of the memories of adult and child natural disaster survivors, 
respectively, suggesting that people do tend to recall best the most critical phase of an 
emergency event. That fewer statements were made comparatively speaking about emotional 
processing and cognitive appraisal likely reflects the fact that fewer questions were asked 
about these aspects than about the phases of the event, as well as that participants’ emotions 
and thoughts of risk did not vary much as the event unfolded. To our knowledge, there is no 
other study that, to date, has compared the recall of the disaster phases with the recall of 
emotional processing and cognitive appraisal in a free narrative or prompted interview. 
Further research in this area is welcome to clarify the relationship between memory for these 
different aspects of a disaster experience. 
No relationship between time since event and amount of information recalled was 
found, except for the amount recalled about the initial context. Here, more statements were 
given when the time between the event and the interview was shorter. Jones, Harvey, and 
Brewin (2007) found that trauma narratives, independent of the level of traumatic stress, 
became more coherent but also shorter over time. The finding of this study suggests that the 
information omitted over time may belong to a specific phase in the event (information about 
the setting, for example) rather than details scattered across the event, and further supports the 
idea that the more critical part of an emergency event is remembered best. 
Finally, a few limitations of the qualitative and exploratory approach of this study 
have to be taken into account. Although the discussions were rich and illustrative, participants 
may have influenced each other. In addition, differences between one-to-one and group 
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interviews must be considered. However, to control group influence, numbers of statements 
were assessed per group and not per participant. The influence of the interviewer on the 
interview, regardless of whether it was a group interview or a one-to-one interview, was 
controlled as much as possible, as participating centres were instructed by a manual as well as 
via an international workshop before the endeavour. The study was designed to give first 
insights into narratives from a wider sample of survivors of different types of disasters; the 
different sample sizes per disaster were affected somewhat by the different incidence rates of 
each disaster type. This study does not claim that the responses of the participants are 
representative of all populations who experience these types of disasters. Nevertheless the 
behavioural, cognitive, and emotional responses identified here might assist in deriving 
research hypotheses for a broader quantitative setting. 
In summary, the current study offers an overview of the most common responses to 
different natural and man-made disasters occurring in domestic and public settings in a wider 
European sample. Although participants reported that the environmental cues and the ability 
to recognise what was happening varied in the different disasters, behavioural, emotional, and 
cognitive responses tended to be more universal across events, and most often were adaptive 
and non-selfish. Several peri-traumatic factors related to current levels of post-traumatic stress 
were identified, while memory quantity was similar across event types and post-traumatic 
stress levels. Time since event had a small effect on what was recalled. 
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Table 1. Socio-demographic and incident-related characteristics of participants 
Characteristics Number Percentage 
Participant   
Native 113 90.4 
Migrant 12 9.6 
Age (M, [SD]) 48.01 [14.15] 
Sex   
Male 59 47.2 
Female 66 52.8 
Education   
Primary 23 18.4 
Secondary 44 35.2 
Tertiary 35 28.0 
Other 8   6.4 
Total [missing] 110 [15] 88.0 [12.0] 
Country   
Czech Republic 42 33.6 
Turkey 19 15.2 
Poland 16 12.6 
Spain 15 12.8 
Germany 14 11.2 
UK 10   8.0 
Sweden 9   7.2 
Type of event   
Fire 52 41.6 
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Flood 35 28.0 
Collapse of a building 16 12.8 
Terrorist attack 12   9.6 
Earthquake 10   8.0 
Injuries to participants 32 25.6 
Fatal casualties during the disaster 51 40.8 
Damage to property of survivors 91 72.8 
Time since event (M, [SD] in years)  4.06 [  2.95] 
Duration of event (M, [SD] in hours)  23.46 [52.51] 
Impact of Event Scale-Revised (M, [SD]) 32.19 [21.16] 
 
















Table 2. Theoretical framework resulting from content analysis with number of statements 




Total number of 
statements 
Course of the event (initial context and emergency phase) 
Recognition/realisation 137 





Way of reacting 44 
Type of reaction 184 
Evacuation decision 82 
Evacuation process 207 
Evacuation route 45 
Way finding 41 
Obstacles and challenges 61 
Interactions 60 
Improvement 91 
Emotional and cognitive processing of the event 
Emotion 120 







Locus of control 44 
Emotion regulation 28 
Expected outcome 43 
Post-crisis impact 18 
Risk perception  90 
Level of risk perception 60 
Nature of risk perception 30 
Worst moment 64 
During the situation 44 





















Terrorist attack  
Interview 
(national) 
Terrorist attack  
 α [95% CI] α [95% CI] α [95% CI] 
Recognition/realisation 0.25 [-0.50; 1.0] 1.0 [0.00; 1.0] 1.0 
[0.00; 
1.0] 
Interpretation 1.0 [0.00; 1.0] 1.0 [0.00; 1.0] 1.0 
[0.00; 
1.0] 












Evacuation process 1.0 [1.0; 1.0] 1.0 [1.0; 1.0] 1.0 
[0.00; 
1.0] 
Improvement 0.75 [0.00; 1.0] 0.55 [-0.13; 1.0] 1.0 
[0.00; 
1.0] 
Recall of emotion 0.46 [-0.35; 1.0] 0.74 [0.20; 1.0] 1.0 
[0.00; 
1.0] 
Self-efficacy 1.0 [1.0; 1.0] 1.0 [1.0; 1.0] 0.64 [1.0; 1.0] 
Risk perception 0.50 [-0.25; 1.0] 1.0 [1.0; 1.0] 1.0 
[0.00; 
1.0] 































Table 4. Descriptions of the initial context and emergency phase resulting from content 
analysis divided into categories with examples of statements from transcripts 










 P Phi 
Realisation/recognition      
Explosion ‘When it exploded. It was a big 
bang and the lights went out . . 
.’. 
22 10 7 3.80 <0.05 0.37 
Smoke/flames/fire ‘I saw the smoke and the 
flames rising’. 
23 8 8 0.49   0.48 0.13 
Water ‘The water went over the road’. 5 0 4 3.75   0.06 0.37 
Noise/shouting ‘They were shouting’. 
 
13 5 5 0.19   0.66 0.08 
Informed by others ‘. . . fire-fighters came and told 
me I have to evacuate, because 
there is a fire in the building’. 
19 9 6 3.31   .07 .35 
Impaired ‘We didn’t hear anything, 
nothing, we were sleeping’. 
8 4 0 5.87 <0.05 0.47 
Interpretation       
Correct 
interpretation 
‘When I woke up I 
immediately realised that there 
was a fire’. 
17 6 4 1.56   0.21 0.24 
Underestimation of 
seriousness 
‘My friend pulled me inside [. . 
.] because I wasn’t taking this 
14 2 7 2.70  0.10 0.32 
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seriously, just being in my own 
little world’. 
Reaction       
Way of reacting       
Instinctive  
Automatic 
‘I turned back and hesitated 
where to hide myself, it was 
such an unconditioned reaction, 
save yourself, man!’. 
23 9 7 2.22   0.13 0.29 
Rational/calm ‘At that time I acted wisely’. 21 4 7 0.49   0.48 0.13 
Resignation ‘I understood straight away—
I’m not getting out—it’s all 
over, so I have to inhale 
enough smoke to be able to, 
well, pass out’. 
7 2 3 0.05   0.82 0.17 
Type of reaction       
Supportive 
behaviour 
‘Everyone helped each other.” 32 9 13 0.60   0.43 0.15 
Save people (family, 
friends, strangers) 
‘I turned back and started 
running, to wake my sister up 
who was sleeping.” 
25 7 9 0.01   0.93 0.02 
Prepare for 
evacuation 
I said to my wife: ‘get dressed, 
but properly. Where are the 
papers? Firstly, the wallet, 
packed all the other stuff and 
then we were thinking about 
20 2 9 5.18 <0.05 0.44 
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what to do next’. 
Seek information ‘We were walking to and fro 
all the time [. . .], tried to call 
someone to get some 
information’. 






















Table 5. Descriptions of emotional and cognitive processing resulting from content analysis 
divided into categories with examples of statements from transcripts 










 P Phi 
Emotion       
Fear ‘Fear. Overriding fear. Absolute 
fear’. 
25 8 10 0.01   0.99 0.02 
Nervousness ‘But it was simply, we were all 
terribly nervous’.  
15 2 7 2.70   0.10 0.32 
Derealisation/ 
dissociation 
‘And for a couple of seconds you 
lose the sense of everything, you 
don’t know where you are, if 
you’re dreaming, if it’s real’. 
12 7 3 4.20 <0.05 0.39 
Panic ‘Then I understood: “Hell, now are 
people dying!”. And then I got 
panic and kept on running’. 
25 9 7 2.22   0.14 0.29 
Physiological 
reaction 
‘I have had a lot of palpitation. I 
was obsessed about the death and 
fear of loss [. . .]. I wasn’t able to 
control my palpitation and wasn't 
able to walk’. 
14 6 2 4.29 <0.05 0.40 
Risk perception       
High level ‘I realised straight away that it was 
lethal danger’. 




Low level ‘I would have said that the risk 
something happens to us was zero’. 
9 0 4 3.76   
0.05 
0.37 
 
 
